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Abstract
In this article, the question is to select the “best” candidates within a set of candidates when
voters cast approval-disapproval ternary ballots. That is, three options are offered to voters: casting
a vote “in favor”, a “neutral” vote or a vote “against” each candidate. We first review desirable prop-
erties that a rule aggregating approval-disapproval ternary ballots should satisfy. We check whether
the rules that have been proposed in the literature satisfy them. Then, we provide comparable
axiomatizations of three rules: one is the lexicographical extension of the Approval rule for binary
ballots; the second is the lexicographical extension of the Disapproval rule for binary ballots; and
the third rule eliminates candidates with more opponents and fewer supporters than other candidates.
Keywords: Approval and Disapproval voting – Compromise – Condorcet principle.
1 Introduction
In elections very little information is generally asked to voters: those are generally asked to choose a
unique candidate or unique party. Approval ballots (see Brams and Fishburn, 1978 or Weber, 1978)
allow to vote in favor of several candidates. Boehm (1976) proposes in a mimeo (reported in Brams and
Fishburn, 1978) what could be referred to disapproval vote, where voters could vote against candidates.
Disapproval vote was used in the former Soviet Union for deputies elections: the rule introduced in 1987
gave voters the possibility to cross off the names of those against whom they wished to vote (see Hahn,
1988). The same rule is used in some Chinese village elections (see Zhong and Chen, 2002). For some
other historical examples of rules that include negative options, see Kang (2010).
An approval ballot does not permit to distinguish between a neutral opinion and a negative one, and
a disapproval ballot does not distinguish between a positive opinion and a neutral one. In an approval-
disapproval ternary ballot, the three separate options are proposed: voters can cast a vote “in favor”,
“neutral” or “against” each candidate. These are qualitative evaluations. Voters are not asked their
cardinal preference on a numerical scale as it is the case with range voting (Smith, 2000) or evaluative
voting (Hillinger, 2004, 2005, Smaoui and Lepelley, 2013). For a discussion of the difference between
qualitative and quantitative evaluations see Balinski and Laraki (2014).
In this article, the question is to select the best candidate within a set of candidates when voters
cast approval-disapproval ternary ballots. We first review desirable properties that a rule aggregating
approval-disapproval ternary ballots should satisfy. Neutrality and Anonymity are standard properties.
Concerning the latter property, we notice that behind the label of Anonymity what is often required is
what we refer to as Anonymity for a given candidate. Anonymity simply requires that the name of the
voters does not matter, while Anonymity for a given candidate requires that only the respective numbers
of votes “in favor” or “against” a candidate matter.
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Next, we distinguish between rules where candidates are globally evaluated on the basis of their own
merits and rules where candidates are compared. When a candidate is evaluated on the basis of his own
merit, what is referred to as Independence in Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986), Kasher and Rubinstein
(1997), Samet and Schmeidler (2003) may be required. This property states that the decision on each
candidate should be made independently of other candidates. An example of a rule that satisfies this
property is the Plurality rule defined by Ju (2005). In this rule a candidate is chosen if he receives more
votes “in favor” than votes “against”.
When the rule deals with questions related to the acceptation of a candidate in a club, candidates
can be evaluated on the basis on their merits. If the question is to select the best candidate within a set
of candidates, those should not only be evaluated on the basis of their merits but also compared. That
is, the relative position of one candidate compared to the others should also matter.
Voters with identical votes (be it, “in favor”, “neutral” or in “against”) on all candidates do not modify
the relative positions of candidates. Therefore, these voters (defined in Brams and Fishburn, 1978, as
unconcerned voters) should not change the result. Independence of unconcerned voters states that voters
who cast an identical vote on all candidates can be disregarded. This property is close to the Contraction
property in Aleskerov, Yakuba and Yuzbashev (2007) and implied by the Cancellation-independence in
Gaertner and Xu (2012).
When candidates are compared, another principle to be used is the Pareto criterion. If, for each voter,
a candidate is worse than another candidate, the worse candidate should not be selected, even if he or she
exhibits good merits (for instance if he or she has more votes “in favor” than votes “against”). Here we
require a stronger property that we refer to Independence of Pareto dominated candidates: if a candidate
is worse than another candidate, not only this candidate should not be chosen, but the selection with his
being present or not should not change the result. This property combines Independence of irrelevant
candidates a la Nash (1950) and Pareto optimality. This property is similar to the Reduction property
in Fishburn (1973).
The application of the Pareto criterion is sufficient to determine what happens to some unanimous
candidates: candidates who only receive votes “in favor” should be selected and those who only receive
votes “against” should be eliminated. The Pareto criterion partly applies to the unanimous candidates
who only receives “neutral” votes, whom we refer to as neutral candidates. The Pareto criterion applies
when neutral candidates face candidates with no vote “against”, or candidates with no vote “in favor”.
But what should happen when a neutral candidate face candidates who have both votes “in favor” and
votes “against”? Here there is a dilemma as neutral candidates have on the one hand, no vote “against”
and, on the other hand, no vote “in favor”. We propose here three possible properties. The first
property, named Choosing neutral candidates, solves the dilemma by selecting the neutral candidates.
This property for a voting rule is close in spirit to the property of Non-compensatory threshold for social
rankings introduced by Aleskerov, Yakuba and Yuzbashev (2007). The second property, Independence
to dropping neutral candidates, solves the dilemma by choosing the “best” candidates among those who
receive votes “against” and votes “in favor”. Choosing neutral candidates suggests to keep the neutral
candidates, while Independence to dropping candidate suggests to select candidates with votes “in favor”
and votes “against”. The third property, Compromise, suggests to solve the dilemma by selecting both
the neutral candidates and the “best” candidates among those who receive votes “against” and votes “in
favor”.
We check whether the rules that have been proposed in the literature (or that can be easily adapted
to approval-disapproval ternary ballots) satisfy the properties. We focus on the Approval-Condorcet-
Elimination procedure (Yılmaz, 1999), the Plurality rule (Ju, 2005) and the Dis&Approval rule (Alcantud
and Laruelle, 2014), the Majority Judgement (Balinski and Laraki, 2007) and the Threshold social
ranking (Aleskerov, Yakuba and Yuzbashev, 2007).
We provide comparable axiomatizations of three rules. The first one is the adaptation of the Threshold
social ranking. It chooses the candidate with the smallest number of votes “against”. In case there are
various candidates with an equal number of votes “against”, the candidates selected are the ones with
the largest number of votes “in favor”. This rule is characterized by Anonymity for a given candidate,
Neutrality, Independence of Pareto dominated candidates, Independence of unconcerned voters and
Choosing neutral candidates. Substituting Choosing neutral candidates by Independence to dropping
neutral candidates permits to characterize a second rule. This rule is the lexicographical generalization of
the approval rule to ternary ballots. It chooses the candidate with the largest number of votes “in favor”,
and in case of ties, the candidates with the smallest number of votes “against” are chosen. Substituting
2
Choosing neutral candidates by the Compromise property leads to the characterization of a third rule
that we refer to as the Compromise rule. In this rule a candidate with fewer votes “in favor” and more
votes “against” than another candidate is eliminated. The Compromise rule selects the candidates who
are eliminated.
It will be shown that the set of candidates selected by the Compromise rule always contains the
candidates selected by the other two rules characterized and by the Dis&approval rule. The Compromise
rule and the Plurality rule or the Median rule have at least one selected candidate in common. By
contrast the Approval-Condorcet-Elimination procedure and the Compromise rule may select different
candidates. In particular we provide a example where a candidate can at the same time obtain fewer
supporters, more opponents than another candidate and be preferred by a majority of voters. This shows
the clash between the Condorcet principle and the principle behind the Compromise rule.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some definitions for approval-disapproval
ternary ballots. Section 3 reviews the different properties to be requested for a rule selecting a candidate.
Section 4 reviews four rules considered in the literature and checks their properties. Section 5 provides
a characterization of three rules. Section 6 gives relations between the Compromise rule and the others.
Section 7 concludes. Appendix contains all the proofs.
2 Ternary ballots
We consider voting situations where voters are asked to make a ternary choice on each available candi-
date, that can be “in favor”, “neutral” or “against”. A ternary ballot summarises a voter’s vote on all
candidates, and a vote profile consists of the total collection of ballots. A voting rule associates to each
vote profile a non empty subset of candidates.
Let N be a countably infinite set, the universe of voters, and let C be a countably infinite set, the
universe of candidates. For each nonempty and finite set of n voters N ⊆ N and each nonempty and finite
set of m candidates C ⊆ C, a voting profile, denoted piNC , is a (n,m) matrix with entries in {−1, 0, 1}:
piNC = (aip) i∈N
cp∈C
where
aip =
 1, if voter i casts a vote “in favor” of cp,0, if voter i casts a “neutral” vote on cp,−1, if voter i casts a vote “against” cp.
Note that the values {−1, 0, 1} are just an easy tool to represent the votes and comptabilize the re-
spective numbers of votes of the three categories. No numerical values are associated to them. Let
Πn,m({−1, 0, 1}) denote the set of (n,m) matrices, and Π be the set of all voting profiles that one can
construct from N and C.
A candidate’s numbers of supporters and opponents are respectively the numbers of votes “in favor”
and votes “against” received by the candidate. Candidate cp’s number of supporters is denoted
n+p (piNC ), the number of opponents n−p (piNC ), while n0p(piNC ) denotes the number of voters who cast a
“neutral” vote. That is,
n+p (piNC ) =
∑
i∈N
aip=1
aip and n−p (piNC ) = −
∑
i∈N
aip=−1
aip, while
n0p(piNC ) = n− n+p (piNC )− n−p (piNC ).
A positive candidate has no opponent, a negative candidate has no supporter and a neutral
candidate has neither opponent nor supporter. That is, cp is a positive candidate if n−p (piNC ) = 0; a
negative candidate if n+p (piNC ) = 0; a neutral candidate if n0p(piNC ) = n. The remaining candidates are
candidates with supporters and opponents: n+p (piNC ) 6= 0 and n−p (piNC ) 6= 0. For each piNC ∈ Π, denote by
C+(piNC ) the set of positive candidates, C−(piNC ) the set of negative candidates, C0(piNC ) the set of neutral
candidates, and by CE(piNC ) the set of candidates with supporters and opponents. Note that any of these
sets can be empty, and C0(piNC ) = C+(piNC ) ∩ C−(piNC ).
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If aip = aiq voter i gives the same vote to candidates cp and cq (be it a vote “in favor”, a “neutral”
vote or a vote “against”). If a voter gives the same vote to all candidates, then the voter is said to be
unconcerned:1 voter i is unconcerned if, for any pair {cp, cq} ⊆ C, it holds that aip = aiq. If aip ≥ aiq,
voter i considers that candidate cp dominates candidate cq. In a voting profile piNC , if all voters consider
that candidate cp dominates candidate cq, then write cp %piN
C
cq. If cp %piN
C
cq but cq %piN
C
cp does not
hold, then candidate cp Pareto dominates candidate cq and denote it cp piN
C
cq. If we compare the
candidates on the basis of their supporters and opponents, another relation of domination can be defined.
We will say that candidate cp dominates candidate cq in terms of supporters and opponents
if cp has more supporters and fewer opponents than cq, and write it as cp wpiN
C
cq. Formally cp wpiN
C
cq if
n+p (piNC ) ≥ n+q (piNC ) and n−p (piNC ) ≤ n−q (piNC ). If cp wpiNC cq but cq wpiNC cp does not hold, then we say that
cp strictly dominates candidate cq in terms of supporters and opponents, and write it as cq ApiN
C
cp. Of
course, if cq piN
C
cp, then cq wpiN
C
cp, while the reverse implication does not hold. Both relations piN
C
and wpiN
C
define preorders on the set of candidates (C,piN
C
) and (C,wpiN
C
).
A voting rule or simply a rule W on Π associates to any possible voting profile piNC ∈ Π a non
empty subset of candidates W(piNC ) ⊆ C.
3 Properties for a voting rule
We are interested in voting rules satisfying Anonymity and Neutrality, which are standard properties in
the literature. Recall that Anonymity requires that exchanging any two voters’ votes does not modify
the selection of the candidates. Neutrality requires that exchanging the votes received by two candidates
results in an exchange of these candidates in the selection. Exchanging candidates or voters are permu-
tations within the set of voters or candidates. Let us denote by S(B) the set of the permutations of the
elements of B.
If we exchange two voters’ ballots this results in a permutation of the rows of the matrix. Formally,
from piNC ∈ Π and σ ∈ S(N), define the matrix piσNC as follows:
piσNC = (aσ(i)p) i∈N
cp∈C
∈ Π.
A rule W on Π satisfies Anonymity if the following holds:
∀piNC ∈ Π,∀σ ∈ S(N), W(piσNC ) =W(piNC ).
Most rules proposed in the literature satisfy a stronger form of Anonymity, that could be referred to as
Anonymity for a given candidate. That is, a permutation of votes for a given candidate does not modify
the result. From piNC ∈ Π, cq ∈ C and σq ∈ S(N) define the matrix piσqNC as follows:
pi
σqN
C = (a
σq
ip ) i∈N
cp∈C
∈ Π,
where
∀i ∈ N, aσqiq = aσq(i)q and ∀cp ∈ C \ {cq}, ∀i ∈ N, aσqip = aip.
A rule W on Π satisfies Anonymity for a given candidate if the following holds:
∀piNC ∈ Π,∀cq ∈ C, ∀σq ∈ S(N), W(piNC ) =W(piσqNC ).
Remark 1. If Anonymity for a given candidate is required, then what matters is the number of
supporters and opponents for each candidate. The selected candidates in any profile piNC ∈ Π can be
determined on the basis of (n+p (piNC ), n−p (piNC ))cp∈C .
Regarding Neutrality, from piNC ∈ Π and σ ∈ S(C), define the matrix piNσC ∈ Π as follows:
piNσC = (aiσ(p)) i∈N
cp∈C
∈ Π.
A rule W on Π satisfies Neutrality if the following holds:
∀piNC ∈ Π,∀σ ∈ S(C), σ(W(piNC )) =W(piNσC).
1Brams and Fishburn (1978) define unconcerned voters as those who are indifferent among all candidates. Here, they
are those who cast an identical vote on all candidates.
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Remark 2. Note that if piNC ∈ Π is such that for each pair of distinct candidates {cp, cq} ⊆ C, it holds
that, for any i ∈ N , aip = aiq, then, by Neutrality, cp ∈ W(piNC ) if and only if cq ∈ W(piNC ).
In order to add desirable properties we have to be more precise about the type of voting rules that
we are looking for. Indeed the type of rule may differ whether the question concerns the membership of
a club or the selection of the “best” candidates.
When the question concerns the membership to a club, what matters is the candidate’s merits, not
the comparison with others. A candidate can just be evaluated on the basis of her or his own merits
and not compared with other candidates. This is what would require the Independence property first
proposed in Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986) for binary profiles of votes. In our context this would mean
that the only information needed to make a decision on a candidate would be the sets of voters who voted
"in favor" and "against" this candidate, respectively. Ju (2005) requires a property that combines the
Independence property and Anonymity. The property states that if a candidate has the same numbers
of voters “in favor” and “against” in two different vote profiles, then the candidate cannot be selected in
one profile and not in the other.
Here, we are interested in choosing the “best” candidate(s) among a given set of candidates. Therefore,
candidates should not only be evaluated on the basis of their merits but also compared. A candidate may
have the same numbers of votes “in favor” and vote “against” in two profiles and be selected because no
other candidate is better in one case and not selected in the other case because others candidates are
better.
When the question is to choose the best candidate(s) properties introducing the comparison of can-
didates have to be used. In comparisons what matters are the relative votes that the candidates received
compared to the others. Unconcerned voters, who cast identical votes (be it, “in favor”, “neutral” or
“against”) on all candidates, do not modify the relative positions of candidates. The following property,
Independence of unconcerned voters, states that unconcerned voters can be disregarded.
A rule W on Π satisfies Independence of unconcerned voters if, for each piNC ∈ Π for which there
exist i ∈ N such that, for each pair {cp, cq} ⊆ C, aip = aiq, it holds that W(piNC ) =W(piN\{i}C ).
Another natural criterion is the Pareto principle: if a candidate is considered as worse than another
candidate by all voters the worse candidate should not be selected.
A rule W on Π satisfies Pareto dominated candidates if, for each piNC ∈ Π such that there exist
cq, cp ∈ C where cq piN
C
cp, it holds that cp /∈ W(piNC ).
Here, we require a stronger property: not only the worse candidate should not be chosen, but the
selection with his being present or not should not change the result. We refer to this property, as the
Independence of Pareto dominated candidates.
A rule W on Π satisfies Independence of Pareto dominated candidates if, for each piNC ∈ Π such
that there exist cq, cp ∈ C where cp piN
C
cq, it holds that W(piNC ) =W(piNC\{cq}).
This property is a combination of the Pareto dominated candidates and the Independence of irrelevant
alternative à la Nash (1950). This latter property in our context would state that if a candidate is
selected, then this candidate remains selected even some non selected (irrelevant) candidates withdraw.
In the same spirit, Balinski and Laraki (2014) require what they refer to as the independence of irrelevant
alternatives in ranking: if a candidate is ranked higher than another candidate, then the ranking between
the candidates cannot be reversed whenever other candidates are added or dropped.
The previous properties permit to determine what happens to candidates on whom all voters cast a
unanimous vote “in favor”: the rule selects a subset of these candidates; and what happens to candidates
on whom all voters cast a unanimous vote “against”: these candidates should not be selected by the
rule.2 By contrast, what happens to neutral candidates, i.e. to elements of C0(piNC ), is not specified.
A rule that satisfies Independence of Pareto dominated candidates will select the neutral candidate
if all other candidates are negative candidates. That is, if the set of candidates reduces to negative and
2Unless all voters are unconcerned and cast votes “against” over C. In this case, by default, all candidates would be
selected.
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neutral candidates: C = C−(piNC ) ∪ C0(piNC ), the selected candidates are the neutral ones. By contrast,
if there is at least a positive candidate, neutral candidates are not selected. If C+(piNC ) 6= ∅ then no
neutral candidate is selected. Nothing is specified whenever the other candidates are mixed candidates,
i.e. C = CE(piNC ) ∪ C0(piNC ).
Three principles can be used, the first one suggests to select the neutral candidates and the second
suggest to drop them and choose among the remaining candidates. The last principle is a compromise
between the first two, it recommends to select the neutral candidates and the “best” candidates among
the remaining candidates.
A ruleW on Π satisfies Choosing neutral candidates if, for each piNC for which C = CE(piNC )∪C0(piNC )
where C0(piNC ) 6= ∅ and CE(piNC ) 6= ∅, it holds that W(piNC ) = C0(piNC ).
A rule W on Π satisfies Independence to dropping neutral candidates if, for each piNC for which
C = CE(piNC ) ∪ C0(piNC ) where C0(piNC ) 6= ∅ and CE(piNC ) 6= ∅, it holds that W(piNC ) =W(piNCE(piNC )).
A ruleW on Π satisfies Compromise if, for each piNC for which C = CE(piNC )∪C0(piNC ) where C0(piNC ) 6= ∅
and CE(piNC ) 6= ∅, it holds that W(piNC ) = C0(piNC ) ∪W(piNCE(piNC )).
The Compromise property states that as soon as there is a vote “against” a candidate (who also
receives at least one vote “in favor”), this candidate cannot be considered as better than a neutral
candidate.
4 Four existing rules
We review here four voting rules for ternary ballots that have been proposed in the literature and check
which properties they satisfy. We focus on the Approval-Condorcet-Elimination rule (Yılmaz, 1999),
the Plurality rule (Ju, 2005), the Dis&approval rule (Alcantud and Laruelle, 2014) and the Median rule
(Balinski, Laraki, 2007). Note that some of them have to be slightly adapted in order to be a rule as
defined in Section 2 (in particular the rule has to select a non-empty set of candidates). At the end of
the section Proposition 1 summarizes the properties satisfied by the four rules.
Yılmaz (1999) introduces theApproval-Condorcet-Elimination rule, that we denoteWACE . This
rule selects the candidate(s) according to an iterative procedure. Given a profile piNC ∈ Π, for each pair
of candidates, the number of votes for a candidate is increased by 1 whenever a voter considers that the
candidate strictly dominates the other candidate. That is, for each pair of distinct candidates {cp, cq} in
profile piNC we compute the number of voters who consider that candidate cp strictly dominates candidate
cq, that we denote mpq(piNC ).
mpq(piNC ) = |{i ∈ N, aip > aiq}| .
Similarly mpq(piNC ) denotes the number of voters who consider that cq strictly dominates candidate cp.
The iterative procedure is as follows:
1. If there exists cp such that, for each cq ∈ C \ {cp} we have mpq(piNC ) > mqp(piNC ), then cp is a
Condorcet winner and so WACE(piNC ) = {cp};
2. else if there is a (unique) candidate cr ∈ C such that, for each cq ∈ C \ {cr}, mqr(piNC ) > mrq(piNC ),
then cr is a Condorcet loser and is eliminated. Set C = C \ {cr}, and go back to point 1;
3. else if arg maxq∈C n−q (piNC ) 6= C, then the candidates belonging to this set are eliminated. Set
C = C \ arg minq∈C n−q (piNC ) and go back to point 1;
4. else WACE(piNC ) = C.
In words, the Approval-Condorcet-Elimination rule combines Condorcet criteria and the elimination
of inferior alternatives. A candidate who receives a Condorcet majority over all others is declared a
winner (point 1); if none exists, any Condorcet loser is eliminated (point 2); if there is no Condorcet
candidate of either kind, candidates with the largest number of disapproval votes are eliminated and the
Condorcet criteria are applied again except in the particular case where each candidate receives the same
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number of disapproval votes (point 3). In the latter case, the entire set of candidates are considered as
winners (point 4).
This rule satisfies Anonymity and Neutrality but does not satisfy the stronger Anonymity for a
given candidate. Indeed as noted in Remark 1, this property requires that only the respective number
of supporters and opponents of all candidates matter: (n+p (piNC ), n−p (piNC ))cp∈C . It is easy to construct
examples of two differents situations piNC and p¯iNC with n+p (piNC ) = n+p (p¯iNC ); n−p (piNC ) = n−p (p¯iNC ) for any
cp ∈ C but WACE(piNC ) 6=WACE(p¯iNC ).
Example 1 Consider the following example with C = {c1, c2} and n = 3:
piNC =
 1 −10 0
−1 1
 and p¯iNC =
 1 −1−1 0
0 1

In both profiles piNC and p¯iNC we have, for each candidate cp ∈ C, n+p (piNC ) = n+p (p¯iNC ) = 1; n−p (piNC ) =
n−p (p¯iNC ) = 1. The difference between piNC and p¯iNC is that the votes of voters 2 and 3 on candidate
c1 are permuted. In profile piNC , voter 2 is indifferent, voter 1 prefers candidate c1 to c2 while the
reverse holds for voter 3: we have m12(piNC ) = m21(piNC ) = 1 and thus WACE(piNC ) = {c1, c2}. In
profile p¯iNC , voter 1 prefers candidate c1 to candidate c2, while voters 2 and 3 prefer candidate c2
to candidate c1: m21(p¯iNC ) = 2 > m12(p¯iNC ) = 1 and thus WACE(p¯iNC ) = {c2}.
This example illustrates that the Condorcet principle does not take into account the intensity of the
vote: voter 1 largely prefers candidate c1 (she votes “in favor” of c1 and “against” c2) while voters 2 and
3 slightly prefer candidate c2 (“neutral” versus “against” and “in favor” versus “neutral” respectively).
Besides, we can expect that rule WACE satisfies the Independence of unconcerned voters: WACE is
based on pairwise comparisons and adding or dropping voters who cast the same vote on all candidates
does not affect the final result. This result is part of Proposition 1. We may have expected WACE to
satisfy the Pareto dominated candidates property. Surprisingly a Pareto dominated candidate can be
selected as illustrated in Example 2.
Example 2 Consider the following example with C = {c1, c2, c3, c4} and n = 7:
piNC =

1 0 1 1
1 0 1 1
−1 1 1 0
−1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 −1 −1 −1
0 −1 −1 −1

In this profile, there is no Condorcet winner, no Condorcet loser, and all candidates have the same
numbers of opponents. In consequence, WACE(piNC ) = {c1, c2, c3, c4}. Candidate c4 is selected
although he is Pareto dominated by candidate c3.
Although a Pareto dominated candidate can be selected, we conjecture that the rule will never select
a Pareto dominated candidate as single winner. The rule WACE does not satisfy the Pareto dominated
candidates property. Consequently, it cannot satisfy the Independence of dominated candidates. It does
not satisfy either the properties concerning neutral candidates: the rule has not a systematic behavior
towards these candidates.
Among the family of rules introduced by Ju (2005), there is the so-called Plurality rule WP in the
context of ternary ballots. For each profile piNC ∈ Π, define the subset, possibly empty, of candidates
P (piNC ) =
{
cp ∈ C : n+p (piNC ) > n−p (piNC )
}
.
The Plurality rule WP is defined as:
WP (piNC ) =
{
P (piNC ) if P (piNC ) 6= ∅,
C otherwise.
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A candidate is selected if his/her number of supporters is larger than his/her number of opponents. In
case no candidate satisfies this condition all candidates are selected.
In rule WP the selection or not of a candidate is totally independent of the selection of the other
candidates (unless no candidate satisfies the requirement). It is a rule that is to be used whenever the
question is whether a candidate is suitable or not for a club membership, not for choosing the “best”
candidate(s). Therefore, it will not be surprising that it does satisfy neither the Pareto dominated
candidates property nor the Independence of unconcerned voters. There is no systematic treatment of
the neutral candidates either.
What could be referred to as the Median rule, WMed, is the restriction of the majority judgement
(Balinski and Laraki, 2007) to three labels, that allows for selecting more than one candidate. Given a
profile piNC ∈ Π,
WMed(piNC ) = arg max
cp∈C
mnp (piNC ), where mnp (piNC ) =

1 if n+p (piNC ) > n/2,
−1 if n−p (piNC ) > n/2,
0 otherwise.
Rule WMed is a rule that independently associates to each candidate her or his median evaluation,
“in favor”, “neutral” or “against”. Then, it selects the subset of candidates whose median evaluation
is “in favor”. If no candidate achieves this evaluation, it selects the subset of candidates whose median
evaluation is neutral. Otherwise, all candidates are selected.
Adding or substracting unconcerned voters may modify the median evaluation of a candidate (and
not necessarily of others). Proposition 1 will confirm that this rule does not satisfy the Independence of
unconcerned voters nor the Pareto dominated candidates criterion. The intuition for the last statement
is that a candidate who is Pareto dominated may obtain the same median evaluation as the candidate
who Pareto dominates her or him. If these two candidates appear to be in the highest evaluation class
both of them will be selected. A neutral candidate will obtain the median evaluation “neutral”. This
may be the highest category or not, depending on the profile.
Alcantud and Laruelle (2014) characterize the Dis&approval ruleWD&A. This rule assigns to each
candidate a score which is the difference between the number of supporters and the number of opponents.
It selects the candidate(s) with the largest score. Given a profile piNC ∈ Π
WD&A(piNC ) = arg max
cp∈C
(n+p (piNC )− n−p (piNC )).
Rule WD&A is a rule that independently associates to each candidate a global score which is the
difference between the number of supporters and the number of opponents. Adding or substracting
unconcerned voters adds or substracts an equal number to all candidates and does not modify the
relative order of the scores. Therefore, we can expect that rule WD&A satisfies the Independence of
unconcerned voters. This rule also satisfies the Independence of Pareto dominated candidates. Indeed,
on the one hand, the score of a Pareto dominated candidate is smaller than the score of the one who
Pareto dominates him or her and, on the other hand, the scores of the different candidates are independent
of each other. A neutral candidate will obtain zero score. Compared with other candidates with both
supporters and opponents, this score may be higher or lower, depending on the profile. No systematic
property can be expected for neutral candidates in this rule.
The following proposition summarizes the results. The proof is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 Let us consider the Approval-Condorcet-Elimination rule (WACE), the Plurality rule
(WP ), the Median rule (WMed) and the Dis&Approval rule (WD&A). We have the following
results:
(i) Anonymity and Neutrality are satisfied by all the above mentioned rules. All these rules but
WACE also satisfy Anonymity for a given candidate;
(ii) Independence of unconcerned voters is satisfied by WACE and WD&A. By contrast, WP and
WMed do not satisfy this property;
(iii) Pareto dominated candidates and Independence of Pareto dominated candidates: WD&A
satisfies the Independence of Pareto dominated candidates (and thus Pareto dominated candidates)
while WACE, WP and WMed do not satisfy the Pareto dominated candidates;
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(iv) Choosing neutral candidates, Independence to dropping neutral candidates and Com-
promises: no rule satisfies any of these three properties.
5 Comparable axiomatic characterizations of three rules
One rule that has been proposed in the literature satisfies Choosing neutral candidates. It is the adap-
tation of the social ranking introduced by Aleskerov, Yakuba and Yuzbashev (2007) in the context of
ternary ballots. This social ranking is defined as a binary relation over all candidates through a lexico-
graphic criterion. Candidate cp dominates candidate cq either if cp has strictly fewer opponents than cq
or, in case cq and cp have the same number of opponents, cp has more supporters than cq. We denote
the corresponding voting rule by WLD and refer to it as the Lexicographical disapproval rule. Rule
WLD selects the candidate who has the smallest number of opponents; ties among candidates are solved
by choosing the candidate(s) with the largest number of supporters. Given a profile piNC ∈ Π,
WLD(piNC ) = arg max
cp∈C−(piNC )
(n+p (piNC )) where C−(piNC ) = arg min
cp∈C
(n−p (piNC )).
Instead of minimizing the number of opponents, we could maximize the number of supporters and
solving ties by choosing the candidate(s) with the smallest number of opponents. We denote this rule
WLA and refer to it as Lexicographical approval. This is indeed a lexicographical extension of the
binary disapproval rule to ternary ballots. Given a profile piNC ∈ Π,
WLA(piNC ) = arg min
cp∈C+(piNC )
(n−p (piNC )) where C+(piNC ) = arg max
cp∈C
(n+p (piNC )).
The Lexicographical approval and the Lexicographical disapproval rules can also be seen as extensions
of the Dis&approval rule. Let
Ws,t(piNC ) = arg max
cp∈C
(sn+p (piNC )− tn−p (piNC )) for some s, t > 0.
The rule chooses the candidates whose weighted difference between his/her number of supporters and
opponents is the largest. For each piNC ∈ Π, we have
WLA(piNC ) =Wn+1,1(piNC ) and WLD(piNC ) =W1,n+1(piNC ).
In rules WD&A, WLA and WLD both numbers of supporters and opponents matter and there is a
compensation between the number of supporters and the number of opponents. In rule WD&A both
numbers are equally important, in ruleWLD much more importance is given to the number of opponents;
while in rule WLA much more importance is given to the number of supporters. So these rules differ
in the importance given to both criteria, but there exists some compensation between the criteria. The
question to be answered in order to choose among these rules is: what is more important, a vote from
a supporter or a vote from an opponent? What we refer to as the Compromise rule, WCo, does not
compare the two criteria. It only eliminates candidates who receive at the same time fewer votes “in
favor” and more votes “against” than another candidate. The rule is based on the dominance relation in
terms of supporters and opponents, wpiN
C
. Given that (C,wpiN
C
) is a finite preorder, the maximal elements
forms a non empty subset of C. The Compromise rule WCo selects them. For each piNC ∈ Π,
WCo(piNC ) =
{
maximal elements of (C,wpiN
C
)
}
.
Rules WLD, WLA and WCo satisfy Anonymity for a given candidate, Neutrality, Independence of
unconcerned voters and the Independence of Pareto dominated candidates. A neutral candidate will
obtain a score of zero inWLD andWLA. Given that what matters forWLD is the number of opponents,
the neutral candidate is better than candidates with both opponents and supporters. The rule WLD
satisfies Choosing neutral candidates. For WLA, what matters is the number of supporters; the neutral
candidate is worse than candidates with both opponents and supporters. Moreover, dropping a neutral
candidate does not affect the score of the other candidates: WLA satisfies Independence to dropping
neutral candidates. It will be shown that WCo satisfies Compromise: a neutral candidate cannot be
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eliminated because he or she has fewer opponents than candidates with both opponents and supporters;
and candidates with both opponents and supporters are not dominated by the neutral candidate because
they have more supporters. The main theorem of this paper tells us that these three rules can be
characterized on the basis of these properties: the only property that distinguishes them is how neutral
candidates are treated when they face candidates with both opponents and supporters.
Theorem 1 Among the rules on Π satisfying Anonymity for a given candidate, Neutrality, Independence
of Pareto dominated candidates and Independence to unconcerned voters,
(i) the Compromise rule, WCo, is the only rule which satisfies Compromise;
(ii) the Lexicographical disapproval rule, WLD, is the only rule which satisfies Choosing neutral candi-
dates;
(iii) the Lexicographical approval rule, WLA, is the only rule which satisfies Independence to dropping
neutral candidates.
Furthermore, the Compromise rule, WCo, is the largest rule with respect to set inclusion which
satisfies Anonymity for a given candidate and Independence of Pareto dominated candidates.
The proof of Theorem 1 and the logical independence of the properties are demonstrated in the
Appendix.
6 Choosing different winners?
The following question concerns the relation between the different rules in terms of selected candidates.
tells us that the Compromise rule is less selective than the Dis&Approval or any of its extensions, in
particular the Lexicographical approval rule or the the Lexicographical disapproval rule.
Proposition 2 For any s, t > 0, it holds that:
∀piNC ∈ Π, WCo(piNC ) ⊇ Ws,t(piNC ).
The proof is ommitted for it is obvious. The drawback of the Compromise rule is that the number
of eliminated candidates may be small. It is indeed easy to construct examples where no candidate is
eliminated.
Example 3 Consider an instance piNC ∈ Π with 5 candidates, C = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5}, and 250 voters such
that:
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
n+p (piNC ) 90 130 115 150 145
n0p(piNC ) 120 60 85 0 25
n−p (piNC ) 40 60 50 100 80
We obtain WCo(piNC ) = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5}. It can be said that each candidate has some thing in
her or his favor: for instance c1 is the candidate with the smallest number of opponents; c4 is the
candidate with the largest number of supporters. Each candidate can be selected by an extension
of the Dis&Approval rule:
WLD(piNC ) = {c1},
WD&A(piNC ) = {c2},
W1,2(piNC ) = {c3},
WLA(piNC ) = {c4},
W2,1(piNC ) = {c5}.
Therefore, it can be said that the Compromise property comes at a price: the number of selected
candidates may increase. The number of selected candidates with the Compromise rule also reflects how
difficult it is to choose among the candidates. It may be because the voters are very polarized in their
votes or because candidates are very similar. Nevertheless, it could also be said that this rule avoids
tyranny of a small majority. To see this, consider the following situation.
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Example 4 The set N of voters contains one hundred elements and C contains three candidates. Pick
any voting profile piNC ∈ Π such that
c1 c2 c3
n+p (piNC ) 50 49 47
n0p(piNC ) 0 3 6
n−p (piNC ) 50 48 47
The three candidates are basically similar, and WCo(piNC ) = {c1, c2, c3}. Candidates differ for few
votes, even if the Lexicographical rules and the Dis&Approval rule select different candidates:
WLA(piNC ) = {c1},
WD&A(piNC ) = {c2},
WLD(piNC ) = {c3}.
Another result concerns the relation between the Compromise rule, on the one hand, and the Median
rule or the Plurality rule, on the other hand. No inclusion relation holds as illustrated in Example 5.
Example 5 Consider the following instances where C = {c1, c2} and N = {1, 2, 3}:
piNC =
 1 −11 1
1 1
 and p¯iNC =
 0 10 1
0 −1

We have:
WCo(piNC ) = {c1}, WP (piNC ) =WMed(piNC ) = {c1, c2},
WCo(p¯iNC ) = {c1, c2} WP (p¯iNC ) =WMed(p¯iNC ) = {c2}.
Still the intersection of the selected candidates between the Compromise rule WCo and either the
Plurality rule WP or the Median rule WMed is never empty as will be shown in Proposition 3 at the
end of the section. By contrast the Compromise ruleWCo and the Approval-Condorcet-Elimination rule
WACE can select different candidates as shown in Example 6.
Example 6 Let piNC ∈ Π be a voting profile with two candidates, C = {c1, c2}, and seven voters:
piNC =

1 −1
1 −1
1 −1
0 1
0 1
−1 0
−1 0

The number of supporters and opponents of the two candidates are respectively:
c1 c2
n+p (piNC ) 3 2
n0p(piNC ) 2 2
n−p (piNC ) 2 3
Thus c1 ApiN
C
c2 with more supporters and fewer opponents, and soWCo(piNC ) = {c1}. The intersec-
tion withWACE(piNC ) is empty. Indeed,m12(piNC ) = 3 andm21(piNC ) = 4, and soWACE(piNC ) = {c2}.
This is an example where the Condorcet principle clashes with the domination relation: a candidate
may be preferred by the majority of voters even if this candidate receives fewer votes “in favor” and more
votes “against” than another candidate. The Condorcet principle takes into account the number of voters
who prefer a candidate to the others, but does not take into account the intensity of the preference.
Proposition 3 summarizes the results of this section. Proof of (i) is given in the Appendix. Proof of
(ii) is provided by Example 6 above.
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Proposition 3 Let us consider the Approval-Condorcet-Elimination rule (WACE), the Plurality rule
(WP ), the Median rule (WMed) and the Compromise rule (WCo). The following holds:
(i) For any voting profile piNC ∈ Π we have
WCo(piNC ) ∩WP (piNC ) 6= ∅ and WCo(piNC ) ∩WMed(piNC ) 6= ∅;
(ii) There exists a voting profile piNC ∈ Π such that
WCo(piNC ) ∩WACE(piNC ) = ∅.
7 Concluding remarks
The review of the properties makes clear a distinction between two different objectives: either accepting
or not candidates on the basis of their exclusive merits or selecting the “best” candidates. In our
opinion, the minimal properties for rules that select the “best” candidates are Neutrality, Anonymity,
Independence of unconcerned voters and Pareto dominated candidates. Surprisingly, few rules proposed
in the literature satisfy these properties. Among the discarded rules, only the Plurality rule satisfies the
Independence property, which is a natural property for rules whose objective is to select candidates on
the basis of their own merits.
Four rules satisfy these minimal properties for selecting the “best” candidates. These are the
Dis&approval rule, the Lexicographical disapproval, the Lexicographical approval and the Compromise
rules. All these rules satisfy Anonymity for a given candidate. What matter to determine the selected
candidates are the respective numbers of supporters and opponents. In three rules there is a compensa-
tion between the number of supporters and opponents. In the Compromise rule both criteria are taken
into account without assigning a weight to any of them.
It may be worth studying rules that satisfy Anonymity but not Anonymity for a given candidate.
Indeed, requiring Anonymity for a given candidate makes lose some information that may be relevant.
Consider two voting profiles of 100 voters voting on 2 candidates. In both profiles, both candidates have
50 supporters and 50 opponents. Both candidates will be selected. But the profiles may be quite different.
In one, 50 voters are supporters of the first candidate, and opponents of the second one, while the other
50 voters are opponents of the first candidate and supporters of the second. In this case, the selection of
both candidates would reflect a polarized society. In the second profile, all voters are unconcerned, 50
voting “in favor” of both candidates and 50 voting “against” both candidates. In this case the selection
of both candidates would reflect the fact that all voters are unconcerned. Similarly, voting rules that
would satisfy Pareto dominated candidates but not the Independence of Pareto dominated candidates
may be investigated.
Concerning the Compromise rule, some other remarks are worth noting. The compromise rule may
be less selective than other rules. In theory, we can easily build example where the rule is little selective.
There exists a trade-off between being selective and avoiding selecting non robust winner. In case the
Compromise rule selects a single candidate, this means that the selected candidate is a very robust
winner. The number of selected candidates with the Compromise rule also reflect how difficult it is to
choose among the candidates. It may be because candidates are very close or because voters are very
polarized. It would be worth testing in practice the Compromise rule.
This analysis has also shown the clash between the Condorcet principle and the evaluation of the
candidates by voters. Basically, voters are not asked to rank candidates but to give their evaluation on
them. So why should we expect the Condorcet principle to be satisfied?
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Anonymity and Neutrality. The fact that WP , WMed, WD&A satisfy Neutrality and Anonymity
for a given candidate must be clear from their respective definition. It must also be clear that WACE
satisfies Anonymity and Neutrality. Nevertheless, as shown in Exemple 1, WACE violates Anonymity
for a given candidate.
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(ii) Independence of unconcerned voters. To show that WD&A satisfies Independence of uncon-
cerned voters, consider a voting profile piNC ∈ Π containing at least two voters and where there exists a
voter i ∈ N who casts, for each cq ∈ C, aiq = 1. Then, for each cq ∈ C, n+q (piNC ) = n+q (piN\{i}C ) + 1 and
so
arg max
cp∈C
(n+p (piNC )− n−p (piNC )) = arg max
cp∈C
(n+p (pi
N\{i}
C )− n−p (piN\{i}C )).
From this, it follows thatWD&A(piNC ) =WD&A(piN\{i}C ). We proceed in a similar way in case there exists
an unconcerned voter i ∈ N who casts, for each cq ∈ C, either aiq = −1 or aiq = 0.
To show that WACE satisfies Independence of unconcerned voters, it suffices to observe that the
mappingsmpq, cp, cq ∈ C, and arg minr∈C n−r are invariant under the operation of deletion of unconcerned
voters.
To show that WP and WMed do not satisfy Independence of unconcerned voters, consider a vot-
ing profile piNC ∈ Π containing an odd number n > 1 of candidates and at least three voters. Assume
that there exist a voter i ∈ N who casts, for each cq ∈ C, aiq = 1, a candidate cp ∈ C such that
n+p (piNC ) = (n+ 1)/2 and n−p (piNC ) = (n− 1)/2, and another candidate cr ∈ C such that n+r (piNC ) = n. We
obtain {cp, cr} ⊆ WP (piNC ), cp 6∈ WP (piN\{i}C ) ∪WMed(piN\{i}C ) and cr ∈ WP (piN\{i}C ) ∩WMed(piN\{i}C ),
which is in contradiction with Independence of unconcerned voters.
(iii) Pareto dominated candidates and Independence of Pareto dominated candidates. To
show thatWD&A satisfies Independence of Pareto dominated candidates, consider a voting profile piNC ∈ Π
containing at least two distinct candidates cp ∈ C and cq ∈ C such that cp Pareto dominates cq, i.e.
cp piN
C
cq. Therefore, for each voter i ∈ N , the following implications hold:
[aiq = 1] =⇒ [aip = 1] and [aip = −1] =⇒ [aiq = −1].
This implies that n+q (piNC ) ≥ n+p (piNC ) and n−q (piNC ) ≤ n−p (piNC ). If n+q (piNC ) = n+p (piNC ) and n−q (piNC ) =
n−p (piNC ), then n0q(piNC ) = n0p(piNC ), which is in contradiction with the relation cp piNC cq. Thus, n+q (piNC ) ≥
n+p (piNC ) and n−q (piNC ) ≤ n−p (piNC ) with at least one strict inequality. By definition of the Dis&approval
rule, we get cp 6∈ WD&A(piNC ) and, of course, WD&A(piNC ) =WD&A(piNC\{cp}).
As shown in Example 2, WACE does not satisfy Pareto dominated candidates.
To show that WP and WMed do not satisfy Pareto dominated candidates, consider a voting profile
piNC ∈ Π containing at least two candidates and three voters and where there exist cp, cq ∈ C such that
n+p (piNC ) = n and n+q (piNC ) = n−1. Candidate cq is Pareto dominated by candidate cp but both candidates
are contained in WP (piNC ) and WMed(piNC ), which is in contradiction with Pareto dominated candidates.
(iii) Choosing neutral candidates, Independence to dropping neutral candidates and Com-
promise. These three properties apply to voting profiles piNC ∈ Π for which C = CE(piNC )∪C0(piNC ) where
C0(piNC ) 6= ∅ and CE(piNC ) 6= ∅. Denote by Π∗ ⊆ Π such subset of voting profiles.
Pick any n > 2 and any piNC ∈ Π∗ where there is cp ∈ CE(piNC ) such that n+p (piNC ) = n − 1. Then,
cp ∈ WP (piNC ) and C0(piNC ) ∩ WP (piNC ) = ∅. Conclude that WP violates Choosing neutral candidates
and Compromise. Next, pick any n > 2 and any piNC ∈ Π∗ where, for each cp ∈ CE(piNC ), we have
n−p (piNC ) = n− 1. In such a case, WP (piNC ) = C, from which we conclude that WP violates Independence
to dropping neutral candidates.
To show thatWD&A does not satisfy Choosing neutral candidates, it suffices to look at the definition
ofWD&A and to remark that, in a voting profile piNC ∈ Π∗, the score n+p (piNC )−n−p (piNC ) of each candidate
cp ∈ C0(piNC ) is equal to zero, while the score n+q (piNC ) − n−q (n−p (piNC ) of a candidate cq ∈ CE(piNC ) can be
positive, negative or equal to zero. In the first case, C0(piNC ) ∩WD&A(piNC ) = ∅, and so Choosing neutral
candidates is violated; in case the score of each cq ∈ CE(piNC ) is negative, then WD&A(piNC ) = C0(piNC ) and
so Independence of dropping neutral candidates and Compromise are violated.
To show that WACE satisfy neither Choosing neutral candidates nor Independence to dropping
neutral candidates nor Compromise, consider a voting profile piNC ∈ Π∗ where C0(piNC ) = {c1}, CE(piNC ) =
{c2}. Ifm12(piNC ) > m21(piNC ), thenWACE(piNC ) = {c1} and so conclude thatWACE violates Compromise
and Independence to dropping neutral candidates. If, instead, m12(piNC ) < m21(piNC ), then WACE(piNC ) =
{c2} and so conclude that Choosing neutral candidates is violated.
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Proceeding in a similar way, we can easily show that WMed violates each of these three properties.
This part is left to the reader. 
8.2 Proof of Theorem 1
(Uniqueness) Pick any rule W that satisfies Anonymity for a given candidate, Neutrality, Independence
of unconcerned voters, Independence of Pareto dominated candidates on Π.
Pick any voting profile piNC ∈ Π. Denote by {c1, c2, . . . , cm} the list of candidates in C and by
{1, . . . , n} the set of voters in N . For c1 ∈ C, there exists a permutation σ1 ∈ S(N) such that i ≥ j im-
plies aσ1i1 ≥ aσ1j1 . By Anonymity for a given candidate,W(piNC ) =W(piσ1NC ). Consider the resulting voting
profile piσ1NC ∈ Π and candidate c2 ∈ C. There exists a permutation σ2 ∈ S(N) such that i ≥ j implies
aσ2σ1i2 ≥ aσ2σ1j2 . By Anonymity for a given candidate, W(piσ1NC ) =W(piσ2σ1NC ), and, by the previous step,
W(piNC ) =W(piσ2σ1NC ). Proceeding in this way for each cq ∈ C, we obtain a profile piσm...σ1NC ∈ Π where
the elements of each column are ranked in nondecreasing order. By Anonymity for a given candidate,
we conclude that W(piNC ) =W(piσm...σ1NC ). For the sake of notation, from now on we will denote p¯iNC the
voting profile piσm...σ1NC obtained from piNC . By construction, p¯iNC is such that, for each candidate cp ∈ C,
the n+p (p¯iNC ) first voters cast a vote “in favor” of cp, and the n−p (p¯iNC ) last voters cast a vote “against” cp.
From this observation, we can deduce that candidate cp ∈ C is Pareto dominated, with respect to %p¯iN
C
,
by candidate cq ∈ C if and only if n+q (p¯iNC ) ≥ n+p (p¯iNC ) and n−q (p¯iNC ) ≤ n−p (p¯iNC ) with at least one strict
inequality. Now, denote by C¯ 6= ∅ the subset of candidates in C that are not Pareto dominated in p¯iNC .
By Independence of Pareto dominated candidates, W(p¯iNC ) = W(p¯iNC¯ ). It remains to prove that W(p¯iNC¯ )
is uniquely determined. If C¯ is a singleton, thenW(p¯iN
C¯
) is uniquely determined by the fact that a voting
rule W is nonempty-valued by definition. So, assume that C¯ contains at least two elements. Pick any
two distinct candidates, cp and cq in C¯. Two exclusive cases arise:
(a) n+p (p¯iNC¯ ) = n
+
q (p¯iNC¯ ) and n
−
p (p¯iNC¯ ) = n
−
q (p¯iNC¯ );
(b) n+p (p¯iNC¯ ) > n
+
q (p¯iNC¯ ) and n
−
p (p¯iNC¯ ) > n
−
q (p¯iNC¯ ).
From (a) and (b) we can endow C¯ with a weak order (i.e. a complete and transitive relation) RC¯
defined as follows:
∀cp, cq ∈ C¯, cpRC¯cq if [ either (a) or (b) holds ].
Therefore, the strict part of RC¯ , denoted by PC¯ , is as follows:
∀cp, cq ∈ C¯, cpPC¯cq if [(b) holds ];
And the indifference part of RC¯ , denoted by IC¯ is as follows:
∀cp, cq ∈ C¯, cpIC¯cq if [(a) holds ].
Denote by C¯/IC¯ the set of indifference classes of (C¯, RC¯), and assume that the cardinality of C¯/IC¯
equals k ≥ 1. We can observe that the maximal elements of (C¯, RC¯) belongs to the same indifference
class denoted by [1]. Similarly, the maximal elements of (C¯ \ [1], RC¯\[1]), where RC¯\[1] refers to the
relation RC¯ restricted to C¯ \ [1], are in the same indifference class denoted by [2]. Proceeding in this way
until the class [k], we deduce that the indifference classes can be ordered as follows:
[1]R∗¯
C
[2]R∗¯
C
· · ·R∗¯
C
[k − 1]R∗¯
C
[k] (1)
where R∗¯
C
is the induced quotient relation (complete, transitive and antisymmetric) on C¯/IC¯ .
To complete the proof, we proceed by induction on the number of indifference classes. If k = 1, then,
by Neutrality and the fact that W is nonempty-valued, W(p¯iN
C¯
) = [1] and so is uniquely determined,
as desired. Next, assume that W(p¯iN
C¯
) is uniquely determined for each p¯iN
C¯
∈ Π such that (C¯, RC¯)
contains k indifference classes where 1 ≤ k < r. Pick any p¯iN
C¯
∈ Π such that (C¯, RC¯) contains k = r
indifference classes. By construction, for each c` ∈ [k], each p ∈ {1, . . . , k} and each cq ∈ [p], we have
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n+` (p¯iNC¯ ) ≤ n+q (p¯iNC¯ ) and n−` (p¯iNC¯ ) ≤ n−q (p¯iNC¯ ). Because the elements of each column of p¯iNC¯ are ranked in
nondecreasing order, we can deduce that the first n+` (p¯iNC¯ ) voters are unconcerned voters and vote “in
favor” of each candidate, while the last n−` (p¯iNC¯ ) voters are unconcerned voters who cast a vote “against”
each candidate. Denote by N ′ ( N this set of unconcerned voters who cast a vote “in favor” of each
candidate or “against” each candidate in the voting profile p¯iN
C¯
. By Unconcerned voters, we deduce that
W(p¯iN
C¯
) = W(p¯iN\N ′
C¯
). Because C¯/IC¯ contains at least two indifference classes, one can observe that
each candidate c` in [k] receive the same positive number of “neutral” votes. Hence, we deduce that
C0(p¯iN\N
′
C¯
) is nonempty and equal to [k]. SinceW(p¯iN
C¯
) =W(p¯iN\N ′
C¯
), it remains to prove thatW(p¯iN\N ′
C¯
)
is uniquely determined. To this end, we distinguish three exclusive cases.
(i) If W satisfies Compromise, we have
W(p¯iN\N ′
C¯
) =W(p¯iN\N ′
C¯\[k] ) ∪ C0(p¯i
N\N ′
C¯
).
The weak order (C¯ \ [k], RC¯\[k]), contains exactly r − 1 indifference classes. By the induction
hypothesis, W(p¯iN\N ′
C¯\[k] ) is uniquely determined, so is W(p¯i
N\N ′
C¯
).
(ii) If W satisfies Choosing neutral candidates, then W(p¯iN\N ′
C¯
) = C0(p¯iN\N
′
C¯
) = [k], and so W(p¯iN\N ′
C¯
)
is uniquely determined.
(iii) If W satisfies Independence to dropping neutral candidates, we have
W(p¯iN\N ′
C¯
) =W(p¯iN\N ′
C¯\[k] ).
The weak order (C¯ \ [k], RC¯\[k]), contains exactly r − 1 indifference classes. By the induction
hypothesis, W(p¯iN\N ′
C¯\[k] ) is uniquely determined, so is W(p¯i
N\N ′
C¯
).
This completes the proof of the uniqueness part.
(Existence) We first show that WCo satisfies Anonymity for a given candidate, Neutrality, Independence
of unconcerned voters, Independence of Pareto dominated candidates, and Compromise on Π.
Anonymity for a given candidate. For any voting profile piNC ∈ Π, any candidate cq ∈ C and any
σq ∈ S(N), it is immediate that n+q (piNC ) = n+q (piσqNC ) and n−q (piNC ) = n−q (piσqNC ), from which we deduce
that WCo(piNC ) =WCo(piσqNC ).
Neutrality. For any voting profile piNC and any candidate σ ∈ S(C), it is immediate that for each cq ∈ C,
n+q (piNC ) = n+σ(q)(piNσC) and n−q (piNC ) = n
−
σ(q)(piNσC), from which we deduce σ(WCo(piNC )) =WCo(piNσC).
Independence of unconcerned voters. Pick any voting profile piNC ∈ Π where there is a voter i ∈ N
such that, for each pair of distinct candidates cp, cq ∈ C, we have aip = aiq. Thus, we obtain:
∃x ∈ {0, 1} such that ∀cp ∈ C, n+p (piNC ) = n+p (piN\{i}C ) + x and n−p (piNC ) = n−p (piN\{i}C ) + (1− x).
We see that cp is a maximal element of (C,wpiN
C
) if and only if cp is a maximal element of (C,wpiN\{i}
C
).
Therefore, by definition of WCo, we conclude that WCo(piNC ) =WCo(piN\{i}C ).
Independence of Pareto dominated candidates. Pick any voting profile piNC ∈ Π such that there
exist two distinct candidates cq, cp ∈ C where cp piN
C
cq. By definition of the relation piN
C
, for
each i ∈ N , aip ≥ aiq with a strict inequality for at least one i ∈ N . This implies that n+p (piNC ) ≥
n+q (piNC ) and n−p (piNC ) ≤ n−q (piNC ) with at least one strict inequality. From which, we conclude that
cp ApiN
C
cq. Note that, for each c` ∈ C \{cq}, n+` (piNC ) = n+` (piNC\{cq}) and n−` (piNC ) = n−` (piNC\{cq}). There-
fore, c` is a maximal element of (C,ApiN
C
) if and only if it is a maximal element of (C \ {cq},ApiN
C\{cq}
),
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and so WCo(piNC ) =WCo(piNC\{cq}).
Compromise. Pick any voting profile piNC such that C = CE(piNC ) ∪ C0(piNC ) and where C0(piNC ) 6= ∅ and
CE(piNC ) 6= ∅. To show: WCo(piNC ) = C0(piNC ) ∪WCo(piNCE(piNC )). We proceed by double-inclusion.
1. First, we prove that WCo(piNC ) ⊆ C0(piNC ) ∪ WCo(piNCE(piNC )). Let cp be a candidate belonging to
WCo(piNC ).
If cp belongs to CE(piNC ), then by definition of WCo, cp necessarily belongs to WCo(piNCE(piNC )).
Indeed, assume by way of contradiction that cp belongs to CE(piNC ) \ WCo(piNCE(piNC )), then there
exists cq ∈ WCo(piNCE(piNC )) such that cp wpiNCE(piNC )
cq. But since CE(piNC ) ⊆ C, it is also true that
cp wpiN
C
cq which contradicts the fact that cp ∈ WCo(piNC ). Because C = CE(piNC ) ∪ C0(piNC ), we
deduce that cp ∈ C0(piNC ) ∪WCo(piNCE(piNC )).
2. Second, we prove that C0(piNC ) ∪ WCo(piNCE(piNC )) ⊆ W
Co(piNC ). Let cp ∈ C0(piNC ) ∪ WCo(piNCE(piNC )).
Next, consider any candidate cq ∈ C = CE(piNC ) ∪ C0(piNC ). Four cases arise:
2.1 If cq ∈ C0(piNC ) and cp ∈ C0(piNC ), then n+q (piNC ) = n+p (piNC ) = 0 and n−q (piNC ) = n−p (piNC ) = 0 and
it is immediate that cp wpiN
C
cq.
2.2 If cq ∈ C0(piNC ) and cp ∈ WCo(piNCE(piNC )) then n
+
q (piNC ) = 0 < n+p (piNC ) which implies cq 6wpiNC cp.
2.3 If cq ∈ CE(piNC ) and cp ∈ C0(piNC ), then n−p (piNC ) = 0 < n−q (piNC ) which implies cq 6wpiNC cp.
2.4 If cq ∈ CE(piNC ) and cp ∈ WCo(piNCE(piNC )), then by definition of W
Co, it holds that cp wpiN
C
cq.
From the above four cases, we conclude that cp belongs to WCo(piNC ).
We now show that WLD satisfies Anonymity for a given candidate, Neutrality, Independence of un-
concerned voters, Independence of Pareto dominated candidates, and Compromise on Π.
Anonymity for a given candidate and Neutrality. The proof is similar to the one given above for
WCo and so is omitted.
Independence of unconcerned voters. Pick any voting profile piNC ∈ Π containing at least two voters
and where there exists a voter i ∈ N who casts, for each cq ∈ C, aiq = −1. Then, we have
C−(piNC )
def= arg max
cp∈Cp
(n−p (piNC )) = arg max
cp∈Cp
(n−p (pi
N\{i}
C ))
def= C−(piN\{i}C ),
and so WLD(piNC ) =WLD(piN\{i}C ), as desired.
Next, suppose there exists a voter i ∈ N who casts, either aiq = 1 for each cq ∈ C, or aiq = 0
for each cq ∈ C. Obviously, C−(piNC ) = C−(piN\{i}C ), and, for each cq ∈ C−(piN\{i}C ), either n+q (piNC ) =
n+q (pi
N\{i}
C ) + 1 or n+q (piNC ) = n+q (pi
N\{i}
C ). It follows that
arg max
cr∈C−(piNC )
(n+r (piNC )) = arg max
cr∈C−(piN\{i}C )
(n+r (pi
N\{i}
C )),
and so WLD(piNC ) =WLD(piN\{i}C ), as desired.
Independence of Pareto dominated candidates. Consider a voting profile piNC ∈ Π where candidate
cp ∈ C is Pareto dominated by another candidate cq 6= cp. Two cases arise. If cp does not belong to
C−(piNC )
def= arg min
cr∈C
(n−r (piNC )),
then cp 6∈ WLD(piNC ) and WLD(piNC ) = WLD(piNC\{cp}) where the equality follows from the definition of
the Lexicographical disapproval rule. If cp belongs to C−(piNC ), observe that cq ∈ C−(piNC ). Because
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n−q (piNC ) = n−p (piNC ) and cq Pareto dominates cp, we necessarily have n+q (piNC ) > n+p (piNC ). Therefore,
cp 6∈ WLD(piNC ) and WLD(piNC ) =WLD(piNC\{cp}).
Choosing neutral candidates. Consider a voting profile piNC ∈ Π such that C = CE(piNC ) ∪ C0(piNC )
and where C0(piNC ) 6= ∅ and CE(piNC ) 6= ∅. Because the number of votes “against” received by a candidate
in CE(piNC ) is always positive, we can conclude that arg mincp∈C n−(piNC ) = C0(piNC ). By definition of the
Lexicographical disapproval rule, we easily conclude that WLD(piNC ) = C0(piNC ), as desired.
To prove that WLA satisfies Anonymity for a given candidate, Neutrality, Independence of uncon-
cerned voters, Independence of Pareto dominated candidates, and Independence to dropping candidates
on Π, we proceed in a similar way as above for WLD. The details are left to the reader. This concludes
the existence part.
It remains to show thatWCo is the largest rule with respect to set inclusion which satisfies Anonymity
for a given candidate and Independence of Pareto dominated candidates. By the existence part, WCo
satisfies these two properties. By the uniqueness part, if a rule satisfies Anonymity for a given candidate
and Independence of Pareto dominated candidates, then, for each piNC ∈ Π, this rule selects a subset of
C¯ 6= ∅, i.e. the subset of candidates in C that are not Pareto dominated in p¯iNC (see the uniqueness part).
By combining point (i) of the uniqueness part with the existence part, we have:
WCo(p¯iN
C¯
) =WCo(p¯iN\N ′
C¯
) and WCo(p¯iN\N ′
C¯
) =WCo(p¯iN\N ′
C¯\[k] ) ∪ C0(p¯i
N\N ′
C¯
).
Using an inductive argument from p¯iN\N
′
C¯\[k] , we conclude that WCo(p¯i
N\N ′
C¯
) = C¯. 
8.3 Logical independence of the properties
The logical independence of the properties used to characterize WCo can be demonstrated as follows:
1. For each piNC ∈ Π, let D(piNC ) be the set of candidates cp ∈ C such that n+p (piNC ) = 1. Let W be
the rule defined as follows: W(piNC ) = WCo(piNC ) \ D(piNC ) if WCo(piNC ) 6⊆ D(piNC ), and W(piNC ) =
WCo(piNC ) otherwise.
The rule W is clearly different fromWCo. For instance, consider the following voting profile where
C = {c1, c2}. We have
W


1 1
0 1
0 −1
0 −1

 = {c2} and WCo


1 1
0 1
0 −1
0 −1

 = {c1, c2}.
The rule W satisfies Anonymity for a given candidate, Neutrality, Independence of Pareto domi-
nated candidates and Compromise, but violates Independence of unconcerned voters. For instance,
consider the above example. The first voter is indifferent between c1 and c2 but
W


0 1
0 −1
0 −1

 = {c1} 6=W


1 1
0 1
0 −1
0 −1

 = {c2}.
2. The constant rule W defined, for each piNC ∈ Π, as W(piNC ) = C, satisfies Anonymity for a given
candidate, Neutrality, Independence of unconcerned voters and Compromise, but violates Indepen-
dence of Pareto dominated candidates.
3. By point (ii) of Theorem 1, the Lexicographical disapproval rule WLD violates Compromise but
satisfies Anonymity for a given candidate, Neutrality, Independence of unconcerned voters and
Independence of Pareto dominated candidates.
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4. Consider the rule W which associates to each piNC ∈ Π, the set of maximal elements of the relation
(C,piN
C
). It must be clear that W satisfies Neutrality Independence of unconcerned voters, Inde-
pendence of Pareto dominated candidates and Compromise, but violates Anonymity for a given
candidate.
5. Pick some c∗ in C and letW be the rule defined as follows: for each piNC ∈ Π where c∗ ∈ C, if no one
casts a “neutral” vote for c∗ and WCo(piNC ) 6= {c∗}, then W(piNC ) = WCo(piNC ) \ {c∗}; in all other
cases, W(piNC ) = WCo(piNC ). This rule satisfies Anonymity for a given candidate, Independence
of unconcerned voters, Independence of Pareto dominated candidates, Compromise, but violates
Neutrality.
The logical independence of the properties for WLD and WLA are left to the reader.
19
